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Abstract
Deep Learning algorithms have recently become the de-facto paradigm for various
prediction problems, which include many privacy-preserving applications like
online medical image analysis. Presumably, the privacy of data in a deep learning
system is a serious concern. There have been several efforts to analyze and exploit
the information leakages from deep learning architectures to compromise data pri-
vacy. In this paper, however, we attempt to provide an evaluation strategy for such
information leakages through deep neural network architectures by considering a
case study on Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) based image classifier. The
approach takes the aid of low-level hardware information, provided by Hardware
Performance Counters (HPCs), during the execution of a CNN classifier and a sim-
ple hypothesis testing in order to produce an alarm if there exists any information
leakage on the actual input.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, we have seen an outburst of deep learning research in both industry and
academia, as it considerably outperforms prior machine learning based techniques in a wide variety
of domains, such as image recognition [1], machine translation [2, 3], speech processing [4], etc.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) have been widely used successfully for image recognition
tasks, starting from identifying plant and animal species [5] to autonomous driving [6]. CNN is
also recently being used for many other privacy-preserving applications like online medical image
analysis [7, 8], in which the data privacy of any user requires utmost attention. There have been
some recent attempts of reverse engineering and retrieving the parameters of Neural Network by
side-channel information [9, 10, 11] in order to steal the model and jeopardize the privacy. Wei et
al. [12] presented an approach which goes one step further even to determine the input image of an
FPGA-based CNN implementation by observing power side-channel. This growing efforts to reverse
engineer the CNN inputs would directly hamper the privacy of users, which could lead to severe
issues, like discrimination, safety violations, etc. Moreover, it could lead to substantial economic
losses for companies if such private data which is used to train the CNNs is revealed to other parties,
which could include competitors. Hence, in this paper, we pursue an effort to develop an evaluation
strategy for such divulging of neural network inputs. The target scenario in our approach is when
a CNN is executing on a standard desktop, and the evaluator is expected to perform a dynamic
evaluation and throw alarms when it detects possibilities of such leakages when the CNN classifies
its inputs. The tool that the evaluator employs for this detection is a set of registers which are called
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs), present in most of the computing platforms, ranging from
workstations to embedded processors. The data acquired from the HPCs are run-time monitored by
the evaluator, which computes t-statistics of the data to notify that the ongoing CNN classifier is
emanating side channel information which is significant for adversaries to be able to determine the
input even treating the CNN implementation as a black-box.
Preprint. Work in progress.
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Figure 1: The average number of cache-misses during the classification of different categories for
a) MNIST and b) CIFAR-10 dataset
Contribution
We strive to provide an evaluation strategy in order to measure private information leakages, i.e.,
the actual input to the deep neural network architecture during its prediction operation using readily
available Hardware Performance Counters and basic hypothesis testing methodology, which to the
best of our knowledge has not been attempted so far.
2 Motivation behind the Work
The process of classification by any DNN based classifier consists of a series of multiplication and
addition operations that it executes on the computing environment (i.e., CPUs or GPUs)∗. It is a
well established fact in the literature that the execution of any process on the CPU leaks valuable
side-channel information through processor cache, branch predictor unit and other low-level hardware
activities [13]. The motivation behind this work is to explore the possibility of private information
leakages in terms of these hardware events during the classification operation of a CNN before
deploying it in a large-scale application.
In order to demonstrate the idea of information leakage we consider two publicly available image
datasets MNIST [14] and CIFAR-10 [15] in our study. Most images in these datasets have little
or no clutter, and the classification objects tend to be centered in each of the images. Our main
speculation from these datasets is that the effect of CNN operations on the hardware activities will be
different for different categories, as different images belonging to a particular class activates a set of
neuron in the CNN, which might not get activated for other images belonging to a different class. The
activation and inactivation of these neurons influence the CNN operation affecting CPU cache, branch
predictor and other units differently for different categories. In order to support the claim we monitor
the average number of cache-misses (The measurement of these hardware activities is discussed in
Section 3 and Section 4 in more details) for both the dataset while classifying each category through
a CNN model and present the result in Figure 1†. The figure shows that the average number of
cache-misses is different for different categories showing a possible venue for information leakage
which depends on the input. The observation in Figure 1 motivates us to use the information provided
by the low-level hardware events in order to develop our evaluation framework. In the next section,
we present a brief discussion on how these hardware activities can be measured in a computing
environment using HPCs.
3 Measuring Hardware Activities using Hardware Performance Counters
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) are a set of special purpose registers, which are built into
most of the modern microprocessor’s Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) to dynamically observe
the hardware related activities in a computing environment. These registers can be programmed
easily to collect the number of occurrences of different micro-architectural events (like cache misses,
∗In this work, we focus on the CPU implementation of an image classifier based on CNN.
†Without loss of generality, we present the result for four different categories for both the datasets.
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(a)
  2,26,77,01,129      branches
       6,24,60,873      branch-misses
     61,95,45,765      bus-cycles
          83,64,694      cache-misses
       6,34,15,934      cache-references
16,22,12,80,350      cycles
12,09,42,22,814      instructions
15,99,20,10,924      ref-cycles
(b)
Figure 2: Function of the Evaluator: a) The Evaluator can only monitor the hardware events of
the computing environment during the classification operation for a User. b) The values of different
hardware events during the classification of a sample MNIST image. The Evaluator does not know
the input image but can obtain these values.
branch mispredictions, retired instructions, etc.) during the execution of a program in the processor.
The advantage of these performance counters is that they can be accessed very fast without affecting
or slowing down any software execution. HPCs can be monitored dynamically using the perf tool,
available in Linux kernels 2.6.31 and above, which can be invoked with administrative privilege
to access these performance counters with very low granularity. The range of HPC events those
can be monitored using the perf tool is more than 1000 depending on the processor Instruction Set
Architectures. However, in most of the Linux based systems, the perf tool is limited to observing a
maximum of 6 to 8 hardware events in parallel because of the restrictions in the number of built-in
HPC registers. Moreover, some of the events are not even supported by all the processors. Hence,
we have experimented with some of the basic hardware events which are supported accross the
processors. The command to monitor a particular HPC event for a specific process is as follows:
perf stat -e <event_name> -p <process_id>
These HPCs are widely used as a source of side-channel [16, 17, 18] in order to compromise the
security of several mathematically elegant cryptographic encryption algorithms. In the next section,
we present the methodology to evaluate the privacy of a CNN model in the presence of information
leakages in the form of HPCs.
4 Methodology for Evaluation
Let us consider a scenario where a CNN model, trained on the private information, is executed in
a computing environment as shown in Figure 2(a). A group of User can access this model to get
predictions on their respective inputs. Let us also consider the Evaluator who is not provided with the
details of the CNN model but can monitor the HPCs during the execution of the model by its process
id as discussed in Section 3. The Evaluator can only get information as shown in Figure 2(b), which
indicates the quantitative values for different hardware events in a single classification operation.
The evaluator, having the administrative privilege, can be employed to observe the HPC events for
different category of images. The operations of the evaluator are as follows:
1. It monitors different HPC events in parallel during the classification operation of different
categories of input images, considering each category individually. Thus, resulting in
distributions of different HPC events for each class of inputs.
2. It employs a hypothesis testing methodology by computing t-statistics on the distributions
of same HPC events for different categories.
The evaluator raises the alarm if the null hypothesis is rejected, which signifies that the distributions
are different. If the distributions of an HPC event for different inputs are not distinguishable from
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Figure 3: Distributions of HPC events a) cache-misses and b) branches during the testing operation for different
categories of images present in MNIST dataset.
each other, we say that an adversary will not be able to exploit this side-channel information in order
to uncover the private input images, thus indicating an efficient implementation of the CNN model.
In the next section, we evaluate the security of a CNN model considering MNIST and CIFAR-10
dataset as mentioned previously.
5 Results
5.1 Experimental Setup
We have implemented two CNN models for MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset using the tensorflow
library for our evaluation. We executed the models in Intel Xeon E5-2690 CPU having Ubuntu 18.04
with 4.15.0-36-generic kernel. All the hardware related activities are measured using the perf tool
as mentioned previously.
5.2 Case Study on MNIST
We monitored different hardware events during the prediction of each categories for MNIST dataset.
We observed that some of the events can produce different distributions for different categories. The
distributions of events cache-misses and branches for all the test images belonging to different
categories are shown in Figure 3. If we apply t-test on the distributions shown in Figure 3(a), we can
easily distinguish them. The t and p values for the tests are shown in Table 1. The t-test is conducted
with 95% confidence interval. ti,j signifies the t-test on the distribution for category i and category j.
The bold faced results indicates that the two categories can be distinguished using the t-test. All the
distributions shown in Figure 3(b) can not be distinguished using the t-test, but some of the categories
can be. The results are presented in Table 1, which shows that the p-values are significantly higher
for most of the results. Hence, the event cache-misses leaks valuable information on all the input
categories and the event branches can be exploited to distinguish the inputs belonging to category 2
and category 3, which triggers the evaluator to raise an alarm.
5.3 Case Study on CIFAR-10
We also perform the same experimentation for CIFAR-10 dataset. The distributions of events
cache-misses and branches, in this case, are shown in Figure 4. The results of t-tests for the
distributions shown in Figure 4(a) and Figure 4(b) are presented in Table 2. In this case also we can
distinguish between all the distributions if we consider the event cache-misses and the distributions
of category 1 and category 3 can be distinguished using the evant branches. This triggers the
evaluator to raise an alarm about the information leakage related to the input image.
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Figure 4: Distributions of HPC events a) cache-misses and b) branches during the testing operation for different
categories of images present in CIFAR-10 dataset.
Table 1: Results of t-test on the distributions ob-
tained from the HPC events cache-misses and
branches for MNIST dataset
cache-misses branches
t-values p-values t-values p-values
t1,2 -21.8166 ≈0 0.4303 0.6669
t1,3 -25.7566 ≈0 1.6565 0.0977
t1,4 2.5334 0.0113 0.9537 0.3403
t2,3 40.5268 ≈0 -2.0064 0.0449
t2,4 22.6505 ≈0 0.4941 0.6212
t3,4 -20.9758 ≈0 2.5435 0.0110
Table 2: Results of t-test on the distributions ob-
tained from the HPC events cache-misses and
branches for CIFAR-10 dataset
cache-misses branches
t-values p-values t-values p-values
t1,2 4.4643 0.0001 -0.8796 0.3801
t1,3 11.0415 ≈0 2.0810 0.0392
t1,4 -16.3093 ≈0 -1.7474 0.0823
t2,3 -16.9589 ≈0 -1.0332 0.3032
t2,4 -21.2428 ≈0 -0.7535 0.4521
t3,4 -8.4637 ≈0 0.2997 0.7647
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we presented a strategy to evaluate the data privacy of deep neural network architectures
with readily available tools. We took the aid of low-level HPC events and t-test in designing the
evaluation strategy. We presented the result based on a CNN based image classifier on two publicly
available datasets, MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our evaluation tool highlights the need for designing
CNN architectures with indistinguishable CPU footprints while classifying different image categories
in order to implement a privacy preserving classifier. In a future scope of this work, we would also
like to explore the vulnerabilities in other deep learning models with different application scenarios.
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